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“MAXIMUM POSSIBLE ACCURACY” IN 
CREDIT REPORTS 
RICHARD M. HYNES* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) estimates that twenty-one percent of 
credit reports contain material errors,1 and poor credit reports can cause 
significant harm. Credit reports affect whether consumers get loans and how 
much they pay,2 and credit reports are used for more than just credit. Insurers use 
credit reports to set premiums,3 landlords use credit reports to decide whether to 
rent apartments,4 and both private and public employers use credit reports to 
determine whom to hire. When the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) sued an employer for considering credit reports, the Sixth 
Circuit noted that the EEOC itself considered credit reports in filling eighty-four 
of its ninety-seven positions.5 
The EEOC is not alone in criticizing the credit reporting industry. States, 
Senators, and Representatives have taken action aimed at reform.6 Eleven states 
and several cities limit the use of credit reports in employment,7 and Senators 
Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders have co-sponsored legislation that would 
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1.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR AND
ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003 iv (2012), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/section-319-fair-and-accurate-credit-transactions-act-2003-fifth-interim-federaltrade 
-commission/130211factareport.pdf [https://perma.cc/UJ9S-Q7ZV].
2.  See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, KEY DIMENSIONS AND PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CREDIT 
REPORTING SYSTEM 5 (2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201212_cfpb_credit-reporting-white-
paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9GS-6XEF]. 
3.  See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 53–54 (2007).
4.  See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 2.
5. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 748 F.3d 749, 750 (6th Cir.
2014). 
6.  For a humorous criticism, see Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, Credit Reports,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aRrDsbUdY_k [https://perma.cc/W9M4-LL64]. 
7.  See HEATHER MORTON, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, USE OF CREDIT 
INFORMATION IN EMPLOYMENT 2015 LEGISLATION (2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-
services-and-commerce/use-of-credit-information-in-employment-2015-legislation.aspx [https://perma. 
cc/8YCB-LGTG]. 
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impose a national prohibition.8 Additionally, legislation sponsored by 
Representative Maxine Watters would: (i) reduce the period during which 
negative information can appear on credit reports from seven to four years, (ii) 
prohibit credit bureaus from reporting defaults if the consumers settled for less 
than the outstanding balance, (iii) prohibit the reporting of negative information 
related to loans deemed predatory or abusive, and (iv) regulate the scoring 
models users apply to the reports.9 These reforms would limit the content or use 
of credit reports. Other proposed reforms seek to reduce reporting error, either 
by imposing greater liability for mistakes10 or by having the government 
determine the reporting process. For example, Senators Warren and Sanders 
have also co-sponsored legislation that would allow courts to issue injunctions 
under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and have the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) promulgate a rule “establishing the procedures that 
a consumer reporting agency must follow to assure maximum possible 
accuracy.”11 
This article begins with a question neglected by the existing literature: why 
regulate credit reporting at all? Although the answer may seem obvious given the 
importance of credit reports and the number of mistakes, this article argues that 
efficiency justifications for regulation are dubious. More specifically, the credit 
reporting market is imperfect, but existing and proposed regulations are poorly 
designed to address these market failures. Distributional or equitable 
justifications for regulation are more compelling, but the distributional 
consequences of regulation are unpredictable. 
Standard tort theory suggests that liability would force the industry to 
internalize the harm that its mistakes inflict upon consumers and thus take the 
optimal level of care.12 However, the case for holding the industry liable for its 
mistakes is not as strong as it appears. The private harm suffered by consumers 
is much larger than the social harm of mistakes because mistakes provide 
offsetting benefits to those with truly poor credit.13 Mistakes harm lower-risk 
consumers by forcing them to share terms, or pool, with higher-risk consumers, 
but pooling also improves the terms offered to higher-risk consumers. 
This article claims that the social costs of mistakes are smaller than the harm 
suffered by subjects of mistaken reports, not that there are no social costs. But 
 
 8.  Ann-Gerard Flynn, Senator Elizabeth Warren Introduces Legislation to Exclude Credit History 
from Job Applications, MASSLIVE (Aug. 6, 2015), http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2015/08/ 
senator_warren_introduces.html [https://perma.cc/B7YE-ACFE]; Senator Warren Introduces Legislation 
to Prohibit Employers From Requiring Credit Report Disclosure, ELIZABETH WARREN: U.S. SEN. FOR 
MASS. (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=917 [https://perma.cc/8VEB-
2CYG]. 
 9.  Comprehensive Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 2016, H.R. 5282, 114th Cong. 
(2016). 
 10.  See infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. 
 11.  Stop Errors in Credit Reporting and Use Act, S. 1847, 114th Cong. § 3(c) (2015).  
 12.  See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 204 (6th ed. 2012). 
 13.  For a discussion of offsetting benefits (but not credit reporting), see Ariel Porat & Eric Posner, 
Offsetting Benefits, 100 VA. L. REV. 1165 passim (2014).  
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would-be regulators must also explain why companies that use credit reports do 
not have sufficient incentives to demand accurate reports. The most plausible 
theories are that firms may spend too little on information because they will not 
recover these costs in a competitive market14 and that firms may refuse to share 
information about consumers to reduce competition.15 
Liability may exacerbate these market failures because the law holds the 
industry liable for misstatements but not omissions.16 Instead of reducing 
misstatements, liability could cause the industry to refuse to report some 
information at all. But liability is not necessarily counter-productive because the 
FCRA imposes a negligence standard.17 If courts set the correct standard and 
firms meet this standard, firms are not liable, and the law does not discourage 
reporting. 
Firms use credit reports to sort consumers by risk, and society regulates the 
manner in which insurers18 and creditors19 can classify risks. Insurance scholars 
offer efficiency justifications for these laws,20 but the most compelling 
justification (limiting classification expenditures)21 does not justify laws that 
demand accuracy. Insurance scholars place greater emphasis on equity 
justifications.22 These justifications are just as compelling in the credit-reporting 
context. For example, despite claims that old negative information is irrelevant,23 
research has shown that it predicts default.24 However, much like bankruptcy 
provisions that discharge debts25 and prohibit the government and employers 
from discriminating against bankrupt debtors,26 the FCRA provision that 
prohibits the reporting of negative information can help unfortunate debtors.27 
Unfortunately, regulation may not always have the  intended distributional 




 14.  See infra Part III.B. 
 15.  See infra Part III.C. 
 16.  See infra notes 137–139 and accompanying text. 
 17.  See infra Part III.D. 
 18.  See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness in Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. 
L. REV. 403 passim (1985); Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 
S. CAL. L. REV. 195, 208–09 (2014). 
 19.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2012) (prohibiting discrimination in credit markets). 
 20.  See Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 204–14. 
 21.  See infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text. 
 22.  See Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 212–20. 
 23.  See 114 Cong. Rec. 24,903 (1968) (“However, there is a further element here: that irrelevant and 
outdated information be discarded from the file.”). 
 24.  See David K. Musto, What Happens When Information Leaves a Market? Evidence from 
Postbankruptcy Consumers, 77 J. BUS. 725, 746–47 (2004). 
 25.  See, e.g., Richard M. Hynes, Why (Consumer) Bankruptcy, 56 ALA. L. REV. 121, 122 (2004). 
 26.  11 U.S.C. § 525 (2012).  
 27.  Redistribution can sometimes improve efficiency. See infra notes 62–65 and accompanying text. 
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employment is that their use harms minorities,28 but studies find that limiting the 
use of credit reports reduces minority employment.29 
Even the FCRA accuracy provisions may be justified on distributional 
grounds. Ken Abraham argues that imperfect risk proxies cause “differential 
inaccuracy”30 because misidentified consumers disproportionately bear the 
burden of subsidizing the truly high-risk. Mismeasured variables (faulty credit 
reports) are just imperfect proxies for the true variables (perfect credit reports),31 
and the differential inaccuracy argument extends to laws that sanction mistakes. 
Congress did not define the term accuracy in the FCRA.32 If the only goal 
were to maximize efficiency, the CFPB and the courts should interpret accuracy 
to mean predictive accuracy and defer to most industry choices; predictive 
accuracy means that a report allows users to better sort consumers by risk. 
Reducing misstatements does not always improve predictive accuracy; blank 
reports contain no misstatements but provide no help in predicting behavior. 
However, the FCRA calls for “fair and equitable” credit reporting,33 and 
equitable goals may justify the current approach of scrutinizing misstatements 
more heavily than omissions. 
Part II argues that the harms suffered by the subjects of mistaken reports 
almost certainly exceed the social costs of these mistakes because mistakes confer 
offsetting benefits on other consumers. In fact, mistakes can theoretically 
enhance efficiency. Part III argues that plausible market failures can lead to 
 
 28.  Use of Credit Information Beyond Lending: Issues and Reform Proposals: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 188–90 (2010) 
(statement of Chi Chi Wu, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.); Lea Shepard, Toward a Stronger Financial History 
Anti-Discrimination Norm, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1695, 1729–33 (2012); Amy Traub, Discredited: How 
Employment Credit Checks Keep Qualified Workers Out of a Job, DEMOS (Feb. 2013), http://www.demos. 
org/discredited-how-employment-credit-checks-keep-qualified-workers-out-job [https://perma.cc/9Q 
LM-JTAA]; Fact Sheet: Equal Employment for All Act (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.warren.senate.gov 
/files/documents/FACT%20SHEET%20Equal%20Employment%20for%20All%20Act%20-%202013-
12-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7Z4-F2HN]; NAACP Calls for Passage of Legislation to Ban the Use of 
Credit Scores as Determinant of Employment, https://donate.naacp.org/action-alerts/entry/naacp-calls-
for-passage-of-legislation--to-ban-the-use-of-credit-scores-as--determinant-of-employment [https://per 
ma.cc/XR8S-VDRB] (last visited Mar. 12, 2017). 
 29.  See Alexander W. Bartik & Scott T. Nelson, Credit Reports as Résumés: The Incidence of Pre-
Employment Credit Screening 27 (MIT Dep’t of Econ. Graduate Student, Research Paper No. 16-01, 
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2759560 [https://perma.cc/AH4Y-P3UU]; 
Robert Clifford & Daniel Shoag, “No More Credit Score” Employment Credit Check Bans and Signal 
Substitution 4 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research, Working Paper No. RWP16-008, 2016), https:// 
research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=10941&type=WPN [https:// 
perma.cc/6C45-EA2S]. Friedberg, Hynes, and Pattison do not find a statistically significant effect on the 
unemployment duration of minorities, but this could be due to the limited number of minorities in their 
sample. See Leora Friedberg, Richard M. Hynes & Nathaniel Pattison, Who Benefits from Credit Report 
Bans? 1 (Dec. 19, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://pattison-nate.github.io/FHP_Credit 
Bans1219.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV5V-WBZX]. 
 30.  See Abraham, supra note 18, at 431–36.  
 31.  See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 221 (7th ed. 2012). A perfect report 
is itself a proxy for the actual variable: risk. 
 32.  See 1 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR CREDIT REPORTING § 4.2.1.4 (8th ed. 2013).  
 33.  15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2012). 
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inaccuracy, and existing and proposed regulations are poorly designed to address 
these failures. Part IV argues that equitable justifications for regulation are more 
plausible. Part V concludes. 
II 
SOCIAL COSTS OF REPORTING ERRORS 
Reporting errors are common and inflict serious harm. The FTC found a 
material error rate of twenty-one percent,34 with material errors defined as items 
that changed after consumer investigation.35 Restricting attention to errors that 
could affect the terms of automobile credit reduces the error rate to five percent.36 
Consumers spend time and treasure correcting errors,37 and the literature recites 
stories of errors that led to the denial of employment, housing, insurance, or 
credit, or that caused the consumers to earn less or pay more.38 
The reporting industry could reduce mistakes by changing its process. 
Creditors could take greater care to avoid data-entry errors and verify 
consumers’ identities, and they could update account statuses more frequently. 
Credit bureaus could more carefully monitor creditors who furnish information 
and omit information unless it matches a file along multiple dimensions (full 
name, address, social security number, for example). All participants could spend 
more time and money investigating alleged mistakes; currently credit bureaus 
spend less than a dollar investigating each allegation.39 
Liability provides an incentive to minimize mistakes, but the FCRA only 
holds the credit bureau liable for negligent or willful behavior,40 and creditors 




 34. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1. 
35.  Id. at 17. Other estimates differ wildly. See also JON GOLINGER, NAT’L ASSOC. OF STATE 
PIRGS: MISTAKES DO HAPPEN: A LOOK AT ERRORS IN CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS 4 (2004), 
http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Mistakes_Do_Happen_2004_USPIRG.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/2DXU-BFQP] (reporting that 25% of credit reports contained a “serious error” and that 79% of 
credit reports contained some error); MICHAEL A. TURNER ET AL., U.S. CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS: 
MEASURING ACCURACY AND DISPUTE IMPACTS 50 (2011), https://www.transunion.com/docs/ 
rev/aboutTransunion/credit-studies/Efficacy_DQreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8K9-BRMS] (reporting 
an error rate of 0.5%). 
 36.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 1. 
 37.  See, e.g., Julia Cheney et al., Consumer Use of Fraud Alerts and Credit Freezes: An Empirical 
Analysis 5–7 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Discussion Paper No. 14-04, 2014), http://www.philadelphiafed 
.org/consumer-credit-and-payments/payment-cards-center/publications/ discussion-papers/2014/D-2014-
IdentityTheft.pdf [https://perma.cc/75UP-W4N9]. 
 38.  See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, The Jewel of Their Souls: Preventing Identity Theft Through Loss 
Allocation Rules, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 343, 345–49 (2003). 
 39.  See 1 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 32, § 4.5.6.4. 
 40.  15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2012); Id. § 1681o.  
 41.  Creditors are liable for failing to investigate misstatements. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c). 
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liability either through strict liability42 or weakening the FCRA’s preemption of 
state law.43 
The basic case for more liability is based on tort doctrine—strict liability 
causes tortfeasors (the reporting industry) to adopt efficient precautions by 
forcing them to internalize the costs of their actions (misstatements).44 
Negligence can also cause tortfeasors to adopt efficient precautions,45 but not if 
courts find a suboptimal level of care to be non-negligent. Moreover, efficient 
precautions rarely eliminate risk. Once tortfeasors take precautions, they are not 
liable for any harm caused by their actions, and they will engage in too much of 
the activity.46 The analysis is more complicated if victims can take steps to avoid 
loss, but this may not apply in credit reporting. It therefore seems reasonable to 
argue that strict liability would cause the industry to adopt the optimal level of 
care and reporting.47 
Tortfeasors are liable for the victim’s harm, but the private harm to the victim 
of a reporting mistake almost certainly exceeds the social cost of the mistake 
because mistakes confer offsetting benefits on other consumers. In a simple 
model that ignores misallocation, adverse selection, moral hazard, and the 
availability of alternative screening devices, reporting mistakes have no social 
costs; mistakes merely transfer wealth from low-risk consumers to high-risk 
consumers.48 In this way, mistakes resemble errors of omission created by existing 
and proposed limits on the content or use of credit reports or other laws that limit 
the ability of a lender or insurer to offer better terms to lower-risk consumers. In 
this simplified model, credit scores are like test scores in a class that grades on a 
curve. In curved classes, easier tests do not mean higher average grades and there 
are no bonus points. Anything that raises one student’s grade must lower 
another’s. Competitive markets will push users of credit reports to grade on a 
curve, and reforms that enhance one consumer’s credit report and access to credit 
will tend to reduce access for others. 
But the world is plagued by misallocation, adverse selection, moral hazard, 
and signaling costs. And misstatements probably do create social costs, but they 
can also provide benefits. Prior scholars have shown that limits on the content of 
credit reports can theoretically improve welfare by mitigating moral hazard,49 and 
misstatements can improve welfare for precisely the same reason. 
 
 42.  See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Internalizing Identity Theft, 13 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 2, 29–34 
(2009); Sovern, supra note 38, at 391. 
 43.  See, e.g., Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 PENN STATE L. REV. 1, 49–52 
(2008); Elizabeth D. De Armond, Preventing Preemption: Finding Space for States to Regulate 
Consumers’ Credit Reports, 2016 BYU L. REV. 365, 402–03. 
 44.  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 12, at 204. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 38, at 373. 
 48.  See Richard M. Hynes, The Social Costs of Credit Reporting Errors, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 329, 
340–41 (2015). 
 49.  See infra notes 59–69 and accompanying text. 
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A. Distributive Effects Of Reporting Errors 
Both mistakes and limits on credit reporting should impair risk-sorting, 
improving the terms offered to some higher-risk consumers and worsening the 
terms offered to some lower-risk consumers. Both could also create social costs 
due to misallocation, adverse selection, moral hazard, and the search for 
alternative screening mechanisms, but simplifying the analysis demonstrates that 
much of the loss suffered by one consumer is offset by the gains enjoyed by 
others, and vice versa. 
Assume one hundred consumers each borrow $100 in a competitive market 
and that $100 in the future is worth the same as $100 today.50 Eighty consumers 
are considered low-risk and never default. Twenty consumers are high-risk and 
repay nothing twenty percent of the time. If lenders can sort by risk, low-risk 
consumers would promise just $100 because this allows lenders to break even. 
High-risk consumers would promise $125 but would pay $100 on average 
(0.8*$125). If the law prevented lenders from sorting, all consumers would 
promise $104.16 with an average default rate of four percent 
(0.96*$104.16=$100). Since there are twenty high-risk consumers and they repay 
eighty percent of the time, the law confers an aggregate benefit of $333.33 on the 
high-risk consumers (20*0.8*($125-$104.16)). However, this is exactly offset by 
the aggregate loss of the eighty low-risk consumers (80*($104.16-$100)). 
Laws that limit the information in credit reports should also make some high-
risk consumers better off and low-risk consumers worse off. Assume all low-risk 
consumers have perfect credit histories and all high-risk consumers have poor 
histories so that credit reports perfectly distinguish consumers. However, the law 
prohibits the reporting of some negative information so that five high-risk 
consumers have perfect reports, though their actual histories are poor. If lenders 
demand a $100 promise from those with perfect reports, they would lose money 
because a little more than one percent (1.2%) of these debtors will default; 
creditors must demand about $101.19 to break even. The five high-risk 
consumers with perfect credit scores gain an aggregate of $95.24 (5*.8*($125-
$101.19)), precisely the same amount as the aggregate loss of the eighty low-risk 
consumers (80*($101.19-$100)). The law does not affect the other high-risk 
consumers; lenders will continue to demand $125 from them. 
Reporting mistakes can also transfer wealth from low to high-risk consumers. 
Assume that all high-risk consumers have negative reports and nine of the eighty 
low-risk consumers have (false) negative reports. Consumers with perfect reports 
are now all low-risk and will therefore promise $100. Lenders may initially 
demand $125 from the consumers with negative reports, but competition should 
drive the price down to about $116. The actual default rate for consumers with 
 
 50.  Government-owned entities own or insure the majority of mortgages issued in this country. See 
Fed. Reserve, Mortgage Debt Outstanding Chart (Dec. 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econ 
resdata/releases/mortoutstand/current.htm [https://perma.cc/4ZPB-C3VD]. If this insurance offers an 
effective subsidy and is tied to fixed credit scores, changing the number of errors could affect aggregate 
lending. 
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negative reports is about fourteen percent because nine of the twenty-nine 
members of this risk-pool never default. If consumers promised $125, the average 
repayment would exceed $107.75 and lenders would enter the market. 
Each of the nine misidentified consumers pays $16 more because of the 
mistake, but their aggregate loss of $144 equals the high-risk consumers’ gain.51 
Each high-risk consumer promises $9 less and keeps the promise eighty percent 
of the time, so their expected aggregate gain from the mistake is $144, 
(20*$9*0.8=5*$16). Ignoring misallocation, adverse selection, moral hazard, and 
the costs of alternative screening and signaling mechanisms, reporting mistakes 
are no more damaging than a lottery operator misreading the number of a 
winning ticket, causing Alice to win instead of Alan. 
B. Why Credit Reporting Errors May Have Social Costs 
A more realistic analysis suggests that credit-reporting errors probably do 
create social costs, but the same is true of laws that limit credit reporting. First, 
high-risk borrowers may be unwilling to promise the $125 necessary for the loan 
described in II.A. If high-risk borrowers only borrow because of legal limits or 
reporting mistakes, there is misallocation because the cost of giving them a loan 
exceeds the value of the loan to the borrower.52 Sometimes, misallocation is 
acceptable because of the social benefits of granting access to credit or insurance 
to high-risk consumers. To illustrate by analogy, consider the market for health 
insurance. Limits on health insurance classification allow consumers with pre-
existing conditions to pay dramatically less than an amount that reflects their 
actual usage of healthcare resources,53 but few argue that this causes these 
consumers to consume too much healthcare. However, credit-reporting mistakes, 
particularly those that allow high-risk consumers to take on more debt than they 
should, create a plausible risk of misallocation that hurts the borrowers. If 
approved for a larger loan than they can afford, they may face financial distress 
accompanied by severe psychological and health consequences.54 Thus, 
approving inappropriate loans for a high-risk consumer is not always a positive 
for the individual or society; some borrowers may have been better off had they 
never incurred the loans. 
Second, low-risk consumers may be less willing to incur a loan at a given price 
than high-risk consumers, because they repay more often. If credit reporting laws 
or mistakes cause low-risk consumers to leave the market, this results in adverse 
 
 51.  Distributional considerations are discussed in part IV. 
 52.  For the high-risk debtors, a promise to repay $125 has an expected value of $100, the opportunity 
cost of the loan. 
 53.  See, e.g., JEAN P. HALL, REALIZING HEALTH REFORM’S POTENTIAL: WHY A NATIONAL 
HIGH-RISK INSURANCE POOL IS NOT A WORKABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE MARKETPLACE 4 (2014), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2014/dec/1792_hall_highrisk_ 
pools.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LDD-GBLS]. 
 54.  See, e.g., Abby Abrams, How Student Loan Debt Hurts Your Health, TIME (June 11, 2014), 
http://time.com/2854384/student-loan-debt-health/ [https://perma.cc/T5YF-HPVB]. 
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selection,55 the same process that happens in health care insurance markets when 
insurance rates have increased to a threshold that healthy individuals refuse to 
pay. As a result, there is no off-setting benefit to high-risk consumers as the pool 
of consumers has on average deteriorated. 
Third, lenders and low-risk consumers have a strong incentive to find 
alternative methods of identifying those who are low-risk when credit scores do 
not accurately predict repayment or default. Consumers can spend time and 
effort correcting mistakes; these costs can be especially high for victims of identity 
theft.56 Other methods include varying the size of the loan or requiring 
collateral.57 
Finally, mistakes and legal limits can exacerbate moral hazard. Debtors share 
the fruits of their labor with their creditors when they repay, but the law and 
practical realities prevent creditors from fully collecting when debtors suffer 
adverse events and default.58 This reduces debtors’ incentives to avoid adverse 
events, creating moral hazard. Limits on credit reporting can exacerbate this 
moral hazard by lessening the consequences of default as the debtor may 
continue to have access to credit. However, prior scholarship has shown that less 
informative credit histories can also reduce moral hazard and improve social 
welfare. 
Vercammen presents a model in which asymmetric information mitigates 
moral hazard if low-risk debtors can reduce the risk of misclassification by 
working harder.59 In this model, sufficiently long and accurate credit reports allow 
lenders to correctly identify the borrower’s ability (low or high-risk) so that the 
outcome of the debtor’s latest project does not materially affect the lenders’ 
assessment.60 By contrast, if credit reports are imperfect, the project’s outcome 
does affect the borrower’s reputation in credit reports, providing her with an 
additional incentive to work hard.61 
Elul and Gottardi focus on the incentives of the high-risk borrowers.62 
Imperfect credit reports reduce the amount that defaulting debtors pay for future 
 
 55.  For a general discussion of adverse selection, see George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: 
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). For a discussion of adverse 
selection in credit markets, see Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with 
Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393 (1981). 
 56.  See, e.g., Cheney et al., supra note 37. 
 57.  See, e.g., Hellmuth Milde & John G. Riley, Signaling in Credit Markets, 103 Q.J. ECON. 101 
(1988); Kei Kawai & Ken Onishi, Signaling in Online Credit Markets (Aug. 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript).  
 58.  Scholars have long debated whether less generous bankruptcy laws would allow creditors to 
recover more or whether bankrupt debtors simply cannot pay. See, e.g., Robert M. Lawless et al., Did 
Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 (2008); 
Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Rejoinder: Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1087. 
 59.  See, e.g., James A. Vercammen, Credit Bureau Policy and Sustainable Reputation Effects in 
Credit Markets, 62 ECONOMICA 461, 461 (1995).  
 60.  See id. at 462.  
 61.  See id. 
 62.  Ronel Elul & Piero Gottardi, Bankruptcy: Is it Enough to Forgive or Must We Also Forget?, AM. 
ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS, Nov. 2015, at 294, 296.  
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credit by allowing them to pool with other debtors. This pooling has two off-
setting incentive effects. Pooling makes default less painful and thus reduces the 
incentive to avoid default.63 However, the reduced payments allow debtors to 
keep more of their income, thus increasing their incentive to work hard after 
default.64 Elul and Gottardi show that the second effect of post-default effort can 
theoretically outweigh the first effect and that some forgetting could improve 
social welfare.65 
Vercammen, Elul, and Gottardi use their models to justify limits on credit 
reporting, but their arguments can be extended to show that misstatements can 
improve social welfare for precisely the same reasons. The key to their arguments 
is that some low-risk debtors pool with some high-risk debtors. In Vercammen’s 
model, the risk of pooling causes low-risk debtors to exert extra effort to avoid 
this misclassification.66 In Elul and Gottardi’s model, pooling causes defaulting 
debtors to receive better terms that cause them to work harder. In both models 
the pooling occurs because of the omission of negative information in high-risk 
debtor files, but such pooling can also occur because some low-risk debtors have 
false negative information in their files. However, it is not necessary to extend 
these models because Moav and Neeman make this point more broadly. In their 
model of the effect of the precision of information on an agent’s incentives, Moav 
and Neeman show that a test (like a credit report) that misclassifies some low-
risk (high-quality) agents as high-risk (low-quality) can improve welfare.67 
These arguments suggest that mistakes and limits on credit reporting may 
improve welfare; they do not suggest that they must improve welfare because 
they rely on strong assumptions. For example, Elul and Gottardi focus only on 
the incentives of high-risk debtors and assume that low-risk debtors do not need 
to exert effort to succeed. Relaxing this assumption weakens the case for limits 
on reporting because pooling unambiguously reduces the low-risk debtors’ 
incentive to work.68 Moreover, each paper acknowledges that, depending on the 
assumed parameters, limits on credit reporting can also decrease welfare.69 The 
 
 63.  Id. at 313. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See Vercammen, supra note 59, at 462. 
 67.  Omer Moav & Zvika Neeman, The Quality of Information and Incentives for Effort, 43 J. INDUS. 
ECON. 642, 642 (2010) (“Accordingly, both imprecise and very precise public information about the 
agent’s performance may destroy its incentive to exert effort.”). 
 68.  See Elul & Gottardi, supra note 62, at 315. 
 69.  See id. at 313–15; Vercammen, supra note 59, at 472–73. Elul and Gottardi cite another paper to 
suggest that some existing limits on reporting may increase borrowing and therefore improve welfare. 
However, the authors of the study that they cite are more cautious. Bos and Nakamura study the effects 
of a change in Swedish credit reporting that reduced the time during which adverse information remains 
in the file and found that aggregate lending increased after the change. Marieke Bos & Leonard 
Nakamura, Should Defaults be Forgotten? Evidence from Variation in Removal of Negative Consumer 
Credit Information 6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 14–21, 2014). As a result, Bos and 
Nakamura conclude that they are “unable to rule out that the additional access to credit in the new regime 
increased welfare.” Id. at 25–26. Bos and Nakamura also do not rule out the possibility that something 
else (such as an increase in worldwide subprime lending) caused an increase in lending around 2003. 
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same is true of misstatements. Although mistakes can possibly improve aggregate 
welfare, many believe that, given the number of mistakes already in credit 
reports, additional mistakes likely reduce welfare. 
III 
EFFICIENCY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REGULATION 
Credit reporting suffers from market failures that may lead to suboptimal 
accuracy. However, many of the existing and proposed regulations are not well 
designed to address these market failures. 
A. Existing Theories Of Market Failure 
Perhaps surprisingly, it is easier to find efficiency arguments supporting limits 
on the content or use of credit reports than it is to find arguments supporting the 
FCRA’s accuracy requirements. Part II.B discussed two variants of one 
argument—limiting relevant information (thereby increasing asymmetric 
information) can sometimes enhance efficiency by mitigating moral hazard.70 A 
more common argument is that the limits merely restrict access to irrelevant 
information. The FCRA’s legislative history states that old negative information 
is irrelevant,71 and those who support a ban on the use of credit reports in 
employment similarly claim that these reports cannot be used to predict 
employment outcomes.72 It would be surprising if credit reports were literally 
irrelevant to creditors and employers’ assessment of applicants, particularly as 
the term is defined in evidence law.73 That standard merely requires prediction, 
not causation,74 and credit information can be used to predict all sorts of 
surprising outcomes. For example, scholars have found that firms run by more 
frugal CEOs who purchase fewer luxury goods are less likely to make fraudulent 
or erroneous disclosures.75 Credit scores can also help predict whether someone 
will stay in a committed relationship.76 Musto provides much more direct 
   
 
 70.  This argument is sensitive to strong assumptions. See supra notes 59–69 and accompanying text. 
 71.  See 114 Cong. Rec. 24,903 (1968) (“However, there is a further element here: that irrelevant and 
outdated information be discarded from the file.”). 
 72.  See, e.g., Comprehensive Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 2016, H.R. 5282, 114th 
Cong. § 3(4)(C) (2012); Shepard, supra note 28, at 1711; Credit History is Not a Job Qualification: Support 
Equal Employment for All Act, ELIZABETH WARREN FOR SENATE (2016), http://my.elizabeth 
warren.com/page/s/creditreportbill#.Vs4EeTYrIdl [https://perma.cc/P3PT-Y5V9] (“. . .[R]esearch has 
shown that an individual’s credit rating has little or no correlation with his ability to succeed at work.”). 
 73.  FED. R. EVID. 401 (defining evidence as relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence”). 
 74.  See id. 
 75.  Robert H. Davidson et al., Executives’ ‘Off-the-Job’ Behavior, Corporate Culture, and Financial 
Reporting Risk 2–3 (Chi. Booth Research Paper No. 12–24, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2096226 [https://perma.cc/5HME-XP88]. 
 76.  Jane Dokko et al., Credit Scores and Committed Relationships 21–22 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion 
Series, Paper No. 2015-081, 2015), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/files/ 
2015081pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2F2-MXYF]. 
HYNES_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2017  9:42 PM 
98 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 80:87 
evidence, showing that the old information the FCRA currently excludes from 
credit reports can still be used to predict consumer default.77 
The relevance of credit reports in employment is less clear,78 but at least some 
evidence suggests that reports help predict employee behavior. One study found 
a correlation between negative credit history and “counter-productive work 
behavior.”79 However, critics point out that the study defined counter-productive 
work behavior to include a failure to repay debts.80 Thus, the study may merely 
validate the principle that people who have failed to pay past debts are more 
likely to fail to repay future debts.81 A second study found positive correlations 
between credit scores, supervisor ratings, and a measure of conscientiousness, but 
also found a negative correlation with a measure of agreeableness.82 A third study 
is sometimes characterized as demonstrating that there is no relationship 
between credit reports and employment outcomes,83 but that is not what the study 
actually shows. The study compared employees with negative terminations 
against employees with non-negative terminations or who were still with the 
company.84 Employees with negative terminations scored worse on all thirteen 
 
 77.  See Musto, supra note 24, at 25–26. 
 78.  For a survey supportive of the idea that there is a link between credit reports and employment 
outcomes, see James D. Phillips & David D. Schein, Utilizing Credit Reports for Employment Purposes: 
A Legal Bait and Switch Tactic, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 133, 152–56 (2015). For a more skeptical 
summary, see Shepard, supra note 28, at 1711–18. In all of these studies, it is difficult to foresee whether 
information predicts an employee’s performance and some leading firms (including Google) even 
question whether such commonly used metrics as interviews and grades predict performance. Robby 
Soave, Google Executive: GPA, Test Scores ‘Worthless’ for Hiring, DAILY CALLER (June 20, 2013, 4:09 
PM), http://dailycaller.com/2013/06/20/google-executive-gpa-test-scores-worthless-for-hiring/ [https:// 
perma.cc/XGX7-UKL4]. 
 79.  Edward S. Oppler et al., The Relationship Between Financial History and Counterproductive 
Work Behavior, 16 INT’L J. SELECTION & ASSESSMENT 416, 416 (2008). 
 80.  Bob Lawless, The Evidence of Pre-Employment Credit Checks, CREDIT SLIPS (Jan. 2, 2014), 
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/01/the-evidence-on-pre-employment-credit-checks.html [http 
s://perma.cc/K6Z7-MMEU]. 
 81.  See id. 
 82.  Jeremy B. Bernerth et al., An Empirical Investigation of Dispositional Antecedents and 
Performance-Related Outcomes of Credit Scores, 97 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 469, 469 (2012).  
 83.  See, e.g., Comprehensive Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 2016, H.R. 5282, 114th 
Cong. § 3(4)(C) (2016) (“A study entitled, ‘Do Job Applicant Credit Histories Predict Job Performance 
Appraisal Ratings or Termination Decisions?’ published in 2012 found that, although credit history might 
conceptually measure a person’s level of responsibility, ability to meet deadlines, dependability, or 
integrity, it does not, in practice, actually predict an employee’s performance or turnover . . . .”); Amy 
Traub, Credit Reports and Employment: Findings from the 2012 National Survey on Credit Card Debt of 
Low- and Middle-Income Households, 46 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 983, 988 (2013) (“The study found no 
relationship between the various indicators of poor credit and either the performance ratings of active 
employees or whether the employee was terminated.”).  
 84.  Laura Koppes Bryan & Jerry K. Palmer, Do Job Applicant Credit Histories Predict Performance 
Appraisal Ratings or Termination Decisions?, 15 PSYCHOLOGIST-MANAGER J., 106, 106 (2012). This 
study also compared employees on a measure of performance and found no statistically significant 
correlation between all but one of their credit variables and performance. Curiously, the number of times 
that an employee was thirty days late was positively correlated with the performance evaluation. Id. at 
117.  
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credit dimensions considered.85 However, the authors could only be ninety 
percent certain that a few of the differences were not due to chance.86 The authors 
speculate that “chance is probably the best explanation” for the differences in the 
averages.87 Maybe they are correct, but a failure to reject a null hypothesis (there 
is no relationship between credit reports and employment outcomes) with ninety 
percent certainty is very different than a confirmation of the null hypothesis, and 
it is at least as likely that the true differences are much larger than their estimates. 
Their small sample size limited the power of their tests; they studied just twenty-
six employees with a negative termination.88 Moreover, the employer supplied 
the credit information and likely used the information in its hiring decisions.89 
The employer would presumably demand other more positive attributes from 
prospective applicants with bad reports, biasing the predictive power of reports 
downward. 
Even if credit reports are useful for predicting employee behavior, one can 
still argue that their prejudicial effect outweighs their probative value because 
users overestimate their importance. Large, sophisticated users like Citibank and 
Capital One test the predictive value of information,90 but they undoubtedly 
make mistakes. However, to justify regulation, one must also believe that 
Congress (or the CFPB) can better assess risk. Whether one finds this plausible 
depends on one’s view of the relevant competence of government and market 
actors. 
Not all users of credit reports are large and sophisticated. Small lenders, 
employers, and landlords may have neither the time nor the ability to test the 
predictive value of credit reports. Users may be able to purchase expertise in the 
form of predictive scores that summarize the credit reports,91 but perhaps the 
government can identify variables that decisionmakers routinely overweight. 
However, competition can reduce the mistakes made by even small users. Users 
who place undue emphasis on credit reports will make worse decisions than their 
competitors. For instance, they will overestimate the likelihood that consumers 
with high scores will repay their loans and underestimate the likelihood that 
consumers with low scores will repay their loans. In a perfectly competitive 




 85.  Id. at 117. 
 86.  Only a few of the coefficients in the authors’ regressions were statistically significant. Id. 
 87.  Id. at 119. 
 88.  Id. at 112–13. 
 89.  See id. at 107.  
 90.  See, e.g., Alex Woodie, How Credit Card Companies Are Evolving with Big Data, DATANAMI, 
(May 3, 2016), https://www.datanami.com/2016/05/03/credit-card-companies-evolving-big-data/ [https:// 
perma.cc/MCA5-LM9Z]. 
 91.  See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 10–12. 
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use the correct model.92 Imperfect competition obviously limits this argument by 
allowing some mistaken firms to survive. 
The only market failure argument offered by the existing literature to justify 
accuracy requirements is usually expressed in a few sentences. The following text, 
buried in a footnote of the December 2012 FTC study of the error rate in credit 
reports, is typical of the literature: 
Thus, the [credit bureaus] have incentives to provide accurate information to lenders so 
that credit is extended to the appropriate people at the appropriate rate. There may be 
some asymmetry to the incentives, however, as it is more costly to extend credit to a 
consumer who defaults than to miss an opportunity to extend credit to a low-risk 
consumer.93 
Though often repeated,94 this analysis is flawed. An errantly extended loan is 
not one that defaults with certainty but rather one with an expected loss from 
default (roughly the probability of default times the loss from default) that 
exceeds the expected profit. At the margin, these two values should be roughly 
the same. Moreover, if the lender captures the gains from trade, it will internalize 
all of the costs and benefits from more accurate reports. Lenders do not, of 
course, capture all of the gains from trade. 
B. Lessons From The Insurance Literature 
The law regulates insurance risk-classification.95 For example, some states 
prohibit automobile insurers from discriminating based on age, and every state 
prohibits insurers from discriminating based on race.96 Because credit reports are 
just another risk-classification tool, the insurance literature can provide 
regulatory justifications. 
The most plausible efficiency justification focuses on sorting costs. Risk-
classification has purely distributional consequences if one ignores complicating 
factors.97 Limiting risk-classification helps high-risk consumers and hurts low-risk 
consumers. However, if the law limits the amount insurers spend on risk-
classification, insurers no longer have to recover these costs and the benefit 
enjoyed by the high-risk consumers may exceed the loss suffered by the low-risk 
consumers.98 
 
 92.  This argument is somewhat similar to Gary Becker’s claim that competition can reduce the 
effects of animus-based discrimination by employers. See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF 
DISCRIMINATION 35–39 (1957). 
 93.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 94.  For similar statements, see Robert M. Hunt, A Century of Credit Reporting in America 18–19 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 05-13, 2005) (“For lenders, the expected loss associated 
with a type I error (the principal lost) is likely to be higher than the expected loss from a type II error 
(forgone profits on a loan).”); Michael E. Staten & Fred H. Cate, Does the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
Promote Accurate Credit Reporting? 7 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Studies, BABC Paper No. 04-14, 2004) (“On 
a marginal loan, creditors faced higher costs from providing credit to the ‘wrong’ person than from 
denying credit to the ‘right’ person.”).  
 95.  See Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 232–66. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  See supra Part II. 
 98.  See, e.g., Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 208. Restrictions may even benefit the low-risk types 
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Even though this argument might justify some limits on the content or use of 
credit reports, modern advocates do not argue that their reforms will reduce the 
amount spent on credit reports.99 Moreover, the argument is inapplicable to those 
provisions of the FCRA that are designed to increase accuracy. As a general 
matter, the FCRA allows risk-classification as long as the credit bureaus spend 
enough to ensure that the classification is reasonably accurate, and many 
proposed reforms are designed to induce the industry to spend still more to 
increase accuracy. 
A second efficiency argument for regulation is that insurers may be reluctant 
to search for better risk-classification schemes if their competitors can easily copy 
them.100 One can make analogous arguments in credit reporting. Indeed, the 
history of credit reports (or credit ratings) on firms provides an extreme example. 
Today the subject firms pay for their own ratings, but at one time investors 
paid.101 Scholars speculate that the photocopier made the investor-pays model 
unsustainable because it made free-riding easier.102 Investors still pay for 
consumer credit reports, but investors may not be able to recover the full value 
of their information investment. If multiple lenders purchase the same 
information and then compete against each other for the consumer’s business, 
they may bid down the price of the loan to a level that doesn’t allow them to 
recover the cost of the information; information expenses are sunk costs.103 This 
may cause users to be less willing to pay for credit reports, and the lower revenue 
may cause firms that prepare the reports to spend too little to ensure their 
accuracy. 
Insurance scholars also argue that the contract terms offered to some 
individuals may confer positive externalities on the rest of society.104 
Manipulating risk-classification may be more efficient means of subsidizing their 
contracts than using the tax and transfer system.105 However, this is just an 
extension of an equitable or distributional argument, and is therefore addressed 
in part IV.106 
 
by reducing wasteful signaling. See Phillipe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private 
Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 381, 381–82 (1990).  
 99.  One of the justifications for FCRA’s prohibition on reporting old negative information was to 
save on computer storage capacity. See Elul & Gottardi, supra note 62, at 297. 
 100.  See Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 211. Avraham and his co-authors point out that this is a 
dubious justification for prohibitions on some forms of risk-classification because the market may not 
plausibly shift to better mechanisms. 
 101.  See Anil K. Kashyap & Natalia Kovrijnykh, Who Should Pay for Credit Ratings and How?, 29 
REV. FIN. STUD. 420, 423–24 (2016). 
 102.  Id. at 440. 
 103.  Creditors may also free-ride on the initial creditor’s investigation by using its loan or loan-offer 
as a signal of credit-worthiness.  
 104.  See Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 210. 
 105.  Id. at 211. Avraham et al. raise yet another argument: that risk-classification may deter 
individuals from discovering facts about themselves. Id. at 209–10. However, this argument is not easily 
extended to credit reports. 
 106.  See infra notes 196–202, and accompanying text. 
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C. Competition And Credit Reporting 
To understand another possible market failure, one must consider the sources 
of the information in credit reports. Some information comes from public records 
such as court judgments and bankruptcy filings, but most comes from creditors in 
the form of account histories.107 The literature has struggled to explain why 
creditors share this information.108 Creditors that keep their customers’ histories 
secret can prevent competitors from identifying their best customers and can 
charge these customers a higher price. Credit bureaus mitigate this problem by 
denying reports to creditors who refuse to share.109 However, this may not be 
enough to induce sharing. If creditors share information about consumers with 
many competitors, the creditors will bid down the price that they can charge until 
they earn no economic profit.110 
The literature offers several explanations for information sharing. Regulatory 
or structural market power may limit competition and lenders may need 
information about new customers who move into their protected markets.111 
Information sharing may dampen competition to acquire new customers.112 
Committing to share information may induce borrowers to repay their debts.113 
Finally, consumers may refuse to borrow from lenders who do not share 
information.114 Although there is no voluntary credit reporting in the United 
States, the threat of competition could discourage participation. 
Just as competition can discourage sharing information, it can also discourage 
the sharing of accurate information; credit-report mistakes give existing lenders 
an informational advantage. Credit bureaus can combat the incentive to provide 
inaccurate information in the same way that they combat the incentive to share 
no information at all—by denying access to reports to those who provide 
information with a very high error rate. Credit bureaus regularly monitor the 
   
 
 107.  See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 8–9; 1 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 
supra note 32, § 3.2.3. 
 108.  See, e.g., Marco Pagano & Tullio Jappelli, Information Sharing in Credit Markets, 48 J. FIN. 1693 
(1993). 
 109.  See, e.g., id. at 1693 (“[L]enders who do not provide data are denied access to the bureau’s 
files.”). 
 110.  See id. at 1712–13. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Jan Bouckaert & Hans Degryse, Softening Competition by Inducing Switching in Credit Markets, 
52 J. INDUS. ECON. 27, 41–42 (2004); Thomas Gehrig & Rune Stenbacka, Information Sharing and 
Lending Market Competition with Switching Costs and Poaching, 51 EUR. ECON. REV. 77, 77 (2007).  
 113.  A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, Endogenous Communication Among Lenders and 
Entrepreneurial Incentives, 10 REV. FIN. STUD. 205, 205 (1997); A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 
Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device, 44 EUR. ECON. REV. 1951, 1951 (2000). 
 114.  Guofang Huang, What Makes Insurance Companies Voluntarily Share Proprietary Customer 
Information 4 (Nov. 3, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1805220 [https://perma.cc/AH5G-ZUFG]. 
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accuracy of the information supplied by their furnishers and can exclude 
furnishers who make frequent mistakes.115 Once again, however, this may not be 
enough if competitive pressures exceed the countering effects. 
D. Are Regulations Well-Designed For The Market Failures? 
The market may not supply sufficiently accurate credit reports. First, free-
riding may cause firms to underinvest in credit reporting.116 Second, competition 
may cause firms to fail to report accurate information.117 Nevertheless, identifying 
a market failure is not enough to justify regulation. The regulation must also 
improve welfare given the market failure. Unfortunately, many of the FCRA 
provisions designed to improve accuracy are too concerned with misstatements 
in the file and insufficiently concerned with information omitted from the file. 
The FCRA considers credit bureaus to be “consumer reporting agencies”118 
and insists that they “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible 
accuracy.”119 A creditor who provides information is a “furnisher” and cannot 
report information if it “knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the 
information is inaccurate.”120 “Users” must notify the consumer if they take an 
“adverse action” (a denial or offering materially worse terms)121 because of 
information in the credit report.122 This notice entitles the consumer to a free 
credit report;123 consumers can get an additional free report each year.124 If the 
consumer properly disputes information in her report, the credit bureau must 
“conduct a reasonable reinvestigation” which shall include notification of the 
relevant furnisher.125 This notice triggers the furnisher’s own duty to 
reinvestigate.126 
The FCRA allows administrative enforcement127 and private causes of action. 
Negligent violations lead to actual damages and attorneys’ fees;128 willful 
violations also lead to statutory and punitive damages.129 Furnishers face less risk 
of liability than the credit bureaus. Consumers cannot sue furnishers for 
negligently reporting false information; furnishers are only liable for failing to 
 
 115.  See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 2, at 18–19 
 116.  See supra Part III.B. 
 117.  See supra Part III.C.  
 118.  15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (2012).  
 119.  Id. § 1681e(b). 
 120.  Id. § 1681s-2(a). 
 121.  Id. § 1681a(k). 
 122.  Id. § 1681m(a). 
 123.  Id. § 1681j(b). 
 124.  Id. § 1681j(a). 
 125.  Id. § 1681i. 
 126.  Id. § 1681s-2(b). 
 127.  Id. § 1681s. 
 128.  Id. § 1681o.  
 129.  Id. § 1681n. 
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reinvestigate after a credit bureau notification.130 The FCRA preempts most state 
law actions, but the scope of this preemption is unclear. One provision preempts 
actions “in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence” but 
provides an exception for “false information furnished with malice or willful 
intent to injure.”131 A more recently added section preempts state laws regulating 
furnishers and does not contain an exception.132 Courts disagree as to how best 
reconcile the sections. Some courts hold that the latter section preempts all state 
law actions.133 Others hold that the latter provision does not apply to state 
common law actions or to conduct that occurs before the furnisher receives notice 
of a dispute from a consumer reporting agency.134 Scholars have proposed 
reforms that would expose the industry to greater liability, either by weakening 
the preemption provisions135 or by imposing strict liability.136 
As a general rule, the law holds the industry liable for including false 
information in a file but not for omitting truthful information.137 There is a limited 
exception to this rule. Just as the common law required disclosure to correct a 
prior statement made inaccurate by subsequent events,138 the FCRA insists that 
furnishers update reported information.139 But the general point remains. 
American law does not require furnishers to report information. Liability for 
misstatements but not omissions acts as a tax on reporting information that can 
chill furnishers from reporting, credit bureaus from collecting, and users from 
purchasing credit reports. This potential chilling effect is why the common law 
granted qualified immunity to the credit industry.140 
This potential chilling effect may also explain why the FCRA uses a 
negligence standard instead of strict liability. Scholars complain that, in the 
standard economic analysis of tort law, once the tortfeasor takes the required 
precaution she risks no liability and may engage in too much of the activity.141 
 
 130.  Id. § 1681s-2(c).  
 131.  Id. § 1681h(e). 
 132.  Id. § 1681t. 
 133.  For an extended discussion of this conflict, see 1 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 32,  
§ 10.7.4. 
 134.  See id. 
 135.  See De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, supra note 43, at 48–49.  
 136.  See Hoofnagle, supra note 42, at 32–34; Sovern, supra note 38, at 391–94. 
 137.  The industry is also unlikely to face liability for wrongfully including false information that raises 
the consumer’s credit score as many consumers will just remain silent, and even if they report the mistake 
they will have no damages. 
 138.  See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 239–41 (4th ed. 2004). 
 139.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(2) (2012) (requiring that furnishers correct and update certain 
information); Farm Credit Administration, Informational Memorandum, Clarification to FCA 
Regulation §618.8320(B)(7) (Nov. 19, 2012) (2012 WL 5879749 (F.C.A.)) (“[A] CRA [credit reporting 
agency] may report delinquent accounts in consumer reports, but must accurately note later payments or 
other significant activity on the account.”). For a longer discussion of “technical accuracy,” see NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 32, § 4.2.3. 
 140.  See Virginia G. Mauer, Common Law Defamation and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 72 GEO. 
L.J. 95, 100 (1983). 
 141.  See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 12, at 204. 
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Consider, for example, a railroad whose trains emit sparks that can burn the 
farmer’s field. If the railroad is deemed not negligent because it installs spark 
arresters that reduce (but do not eliminate) the risk of fire, it will not consider 
the losses from the remaining fires when deciding how often to run its trains. By 
contrast, strict liability would cause the railroad to internalize all of its trains’ 
costs and to choose the optimal number of trains. In the credit-reporting context 
this is a feature, not a bug. As long as the credit bureaus and the furnishers behave 
reasonably, and courts do not make mistakes, the industry will face no liability 
and there will be no chilling effect. 
Perhaps negligence is not the correct standard. If the social costs of credit 
reporting mistakes are very small or the industry internalizes them, there is no 
need for any liability. Under this view, the common law’s qualified immunity was 
the correct approach, and the only beneficial provisions of the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act are those that preempt state law. On the other hand, if one focuses 
on the costs that consumers incur to correct mistakes, one may believe that the 
social costs of credit reporting are substantial and that creditors do not internalize 
them. This may be particularly true in the identity theft context because 
consumers are highly likely to spend time and effort to correct the mistakes in 
their file. Strict liability then looks more plausible as a way to sidestep some of 
the other problems with a negligence standard (for example, the need to define 
reasonable care).142 
Instead of calling for greater liability, some have advocated for more direct 
government control of credit reporting. For example, legislation co-sponsored by 
Senators Sanders and Warren and legislation sponsored by Representative 
Waters would allow courts to grant injunctive relief under the FCRA and have 
the CFPB promulgate a rule specifying which procedures the credit bureaus 
should adopt to ensure accuracy.143 The efficiency of direct regulation depends 
on the wisdom of the regulators, and some proposals suggest that would-be 
regulators may fail to appreciate the importance of omitted information. 
Consider proposals for improving the matching of information in credit bureau 
files. Proposals would require that credit bureaus match information on more 
dimensions (first and last name, date of birth, social security number, among 
others),144 reducing the risk that information could be wrongfully placed in a 
consumer’s file. However, these reforms would also increase another type of 
error—omitted information. 
For example, assume that a Professor Richard Hynes defaults on an 
obligation to a hospital in Charlottesville, Virginia. Should this information be 
 
 142.  All efforts (including the production of accurate credit reports) can be socially costly if they 
merely change the distribution of wealth. These costs could be substantial if some consumers falsely 
allege that that negative marks in their file are due to mistakes and courts have difficulty determining 
which claims are valid. 
 143.  Comprehensive Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 2016, H.R. 5282, 114th Cong. 
(2016). 
 144.  Id. For a summary of other proposed matching requirements, see Sovern, supra note 38, at 369–
71. 
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included in my file? It is at least possible that obligation was incurred by the more 
famous Professor Richard Hynes, the biologist at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology,145 during a visit to Charlottesville, and refusing to include this 
information will give the hospital an incentive to more effectively identify its 
patients. However, creditors will not always follow best practices, and they will 
often make mistakes. They may, for example, list my name incorrectly as Richard 
O. Hynes. Because of the risk of mistake, credit bureaus will often include 
information in a file as long as it matches the file in two of four identifiers: (i) 
name, (ii) social security number, (iii) date of birth, and (iv) consumer account 
number with a subscriber.146 The bureaus could reduce the number of entries 
wrongly included in my file by requiring more matches, but doing so would 
wrongly exclude some information that should be in my file. The question is 
whether the credit bureaus have the right incentive to choose the matching 
algorithm. If the goal is predictive accuracy, it is not clear why they would choose 
a poor algorithm or why some think that the government would do a better job. 
As explained in part IV, however, the analysis changes if equitable goals are 
considered. 
Consider next proposals for mandating credit reporting by some entities. In 
the United States credit reporting is voluntary, but many countries mandate 
information sharing.147 Some have argued that subprime lenders148 or utility 
companies149 should report customer behavior. These reforms are controversial 
even among consumer advocates. For example, the National Consumer Law 
Center worries that the inclusion of utility records could hurt the credit reports 
of lower-income consumers because they are more likely to miss payments.150 
Note, however, that if other variables indicate which consumers are low-income, 
these reforms should not increase or reduce the perceived risk of lower-income 
consumers as a group because the creditors can already identify them as a 
separate risk-pool. Rather, these reforms are likely to improve the perceived risk 
of some lower-income consumers (those that pay their utility bills on time) and 
reduce the scores of others (those that fall behind). In other words, this 
information would likely improve the predictive power of credit reports. 
An efficient credit reporting system does not increase predictive power at all 
costs. At some point the costs of additional information exceed the benefits of 
improved predictive power. Justifying mandatory reporting requires an 
 
 145.  The other Professor Hynes’ information is available at http://hynes-lab.mit.edu/ [https://perma 
.cc/TN6J-MSCK]. 
 146.  See Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identity Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
89, 97 (2001). 
 147.  See Tullio Jappelli & Marco Pagano, Information Sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-Country 
Evidence, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 2017, 2028 (2002). 
 148.  See Richard R. W. Brooks, Credit Past Due, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 994, 1013 (2006). 
 149.  Ann Carrns, The Movement to Put Utility Payments on Credit Reports, N.Y. TIMES: BUCKS (Oct. 
9, 2012, 2:38 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/the-movement-to-put-utility-payments-on-
credit-reports/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QWK9-MZLC]. 
 150.  Id. 
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explanation for why the industry will not report voluntarily. Free-riding arguably 
prevents the industry from investing sufficiently in information. On the other 
hand, mandatory reporting could have perverse effects as the industry would 
have to recover the cost of collecting the information. This might lead to more 
expensive credit reports which might, in turn, lead to fewer reports used. The 
other efficiency justification for mandatory reporting is that competition may 
deter voluntary reporting. Perhaps this justification applies to the subprime 
market. Although these lenders typically share information with their direct 
competitors (they have their own version of credit reports),151 they may be 
reluctant to report to the standard credit bureaus for fear of losing customers to 
mainstream lenders.152 However, utility companies usually enjoy monopoly 
power;153 they are not refusing to report because of a fear of losing customers. 
IV 
A DISTRIBUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR REGULATION 
Society often sacrifices efficiency for equity.154 Consider the income tax. An 
omniscient government would impose a lump-sum tax (or transfer) that varied 
with each household’s ability to pay, usually assumed to mean potential 
earnings,155 and the size of the tax could vary to fit any definition of equity. The 
tax would not vary with the household’s choices. Thus, there would be no 
distortion and no efficiency loss. Real governments are not omniscient and 
cannot measure a household’s potential earnings. They instead assess a tax that 
increases with a household’s actual (adjusted) earnings, thus distorting choices 
like that between labor and leisure.156 Society accepts these distortions because 
they aid in the transfer wealth to lower-income households.157 
 
 151.  Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, List of Consumer Reporting Companies (Jan. 2016), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_list_consumer-reporting-agencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
M56Q-9C43]. 
 152.  Payday lenders frequently advertise that they do not check credit reports and keep their loans 
confidential. See Jim Hawkins, Using Advertisements to Diagnose Behavioral Market Failure in the 
Payday Lending Market, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 57, 73 (2016). Customers may not want lenders to 
share information because even the act of borrowing from a payday lender may be seen as a negative 
signal by other lenders.  
 153.  See, e.g., Mingjie Gan, Comment, Municipal Boundaries: A Barrier Between Customers and 
Adequate, Uniform, and Affordable Utility Service, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 923, 923 (2016). 
 154.  This article adopts a utilitarian conception of equity. For a discussion of the variants of the 
utilitarian models of equity as well as some alternatives, see generally James Konow, Which is the Fairest 
One of All: A Positive Analysis of Justice, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1188 (2003).  
 155.  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics, 
in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 991, 1014 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987) 
(reviewing the relevant literature on taxation). For a recent overview of the literature, see Emmanuel 
Saez, Joel Slemrod & Seth Giertz, The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: 
A Critical Review, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 3 passim (2012).  
 156.  See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 155, at 991–93 (noting the effect of taxes on incentives and the trade-
off between equity and efficiency). 
 157.  See, e.g., Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, Pareto Optimal Redistribution, 59 AM. 
ECON. REV. 542, 543 (1969) (arguing that “some redistribution will make everyone better off”); Stiglitz, 
supra note 155, at 991–93. 
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By calling for “fair and equitable” credit reporting,158 the FCRA invites 
distributional considerations. The insurance literature provides a sense of these 
considerations. First, insurance scholars argue that society does not want insurers 
to use inherently suspect classifications such as those based on race.159 The desire 
to limit racial discrimination provides at least some of the motivation for the 
proposed prohibition on using credit reports in employment.160 These calls are 
not merely academic; the EEOC has sued firms that use credit scores in 
employment screening, claiming that this practice has a disparate impact on 
minorities.161 Additionally, eleven states have passed laws restricting their use in 
employment.162 
Just as advocates have used racial justice arguments to call for the restriction 
of the use of credit scores in employment, scholars and advocates have used 
similar claims to call for restricting the use of testing, criminal background checks, 
and drug testing for employment purposes.163 However, other scholars have 
pointed out that these restrictions can actually reduce minority employment even 
if employment tests, criminal background checks, and drug tests are biased 
against minorities.164 This counter-intuitive argument suggests that the 
restrictions could cause the employers to rely more heavily on signals that are 
even more biased against minorities (interviews for example) or simply refuse to 
hire minority applicants because they assume that they would have failed the 
background check, employment test, or drug test.165 These critiques are less 
powerful if the law effectively prevents employers from using the alternative 
 
 158.  15 U.S.C. § 1681a (2012). 
 159.  See Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 215. 
 160.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
 161.  Kevin P. McGowan, EEOC’s Failure to Show Disparate Impact Dooms Credit Check Bias Case, 
Court Affirms, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.bna.com/eeocs-failure-show-n1717988 
9528/ [https://perma.cc/LQN4-4P3H]. 
 162.  See MORTON, supra note 7. 
 163.  See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE WAR ON 
DRUGS (2007); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); Michael Carlin 
& Ellen Frick, Criminal Records, Collateral Consequences, and Employment: The FCRA and Title VII in 
Discrimination Against Persons with Criminal Records, 12 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 109 (2013) 
(documenting the statutory scheme and impact of the use of criminal records in the hiring process as well 
as potential solutions to this problem); Kimani Paule-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-
Offender Status, and Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893 (2014).  
 164.  See David H. Autor & David Scarborough, Does Job Testing Harm Minority Workers? Evidence 
from Retail Establishments, 123 Q.J. ECON. 219, 222 (2008); Harr J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality, 
Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 452 
(2006); Abigail Wozniak, Discrimination and the Effects of Drug Testing on Black Employment, 97 REV. 
ECON. STAT. 548, 548 (2015). 
 165.  See Autor & Scarborough, supra note 164, at 222 (“So long as the information provided by job 
tests about minority applicants is not systematically more negative than firms’ beliefs derived from 
informal screens, job testing has the potential to raise productivity without a disparate impact on minority 
hiring.”); Holzer et al., supra note 164, at 452 (suggesting that “the net effect of criminal background 
checks on the hiring of [African Americans] is theoretically ambiguous”); Wozniak, supra note 164, at 
548 (“Drug testing provides a means for nonusing blacks to prove their status to employers, even as the 
drug war linked blacks with drug use in the popular imagination.”). 
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signals or otherwise discriminating against minorities. Further, the actual effect 
of restrictions on the use of employment testing and criminal background checks 
is an empirical question. 
The available evidence suggests that laws meant to help minority job 
applicants actually hurt them. Clifford and Schoag looked at changes in 
employment after states enact a limit on the use of credit reports.166 They found 
that these laws tend to increase black unemployment.167 Bartik and Nelson 
employed a similar strategy, finding that these laws increased the likelihood that 
blacks would lose their jobs and reduced the chance that they would find a new 
job.168 Although these are just two working papers, the literature on related 
restrictions further supports the claim that restrictions on employment screening 
may not help and may actually harm minorities. For example, Autor and 
Scarborough found that job testing has no measurable impact on minority 
hiring.169 Wozniak found that laws that encourage drug-testing increase black 
unemployment and decrease wages, and that laws that discourage drug-testing 
result in the substitution of white women for black men.170 Holzer et al., found 
that firms that use criminal background checks are more likely to hire African 
American workers.171 Further, Doleac and Hansen found that recently enacted 
“ban the box” statutes reduce minority employment.172  
A second argument in favor of restricting risk-classification is that some 
individuals are high-risk for reasons beyond their control; thus society wants to 
spread the costs as a matter of social solidarity.173 For example, society prohibits 
insurers from charging higher premiums to individuals with genetic diseases174 
because these individuals’ choices did not cause their disease. In other cases, 
higher risk is only partially due to an individual’s choices, and society may accept 
some moral hazard as the price of spreading the costs. For example, advocates of 
restrictions on the use of credit scores in employment argue that bad credit scores 
are often due to medical emergencies or other events that are not typically 
associated with moral hazard.175 The current gag rule on the use of old credit 
 
 166.  See Clifford & Schoag, supra note 29, at 4. 
 167.  See id. at 3–4. 
 168.  See Bartik & Nelson, supra note 29, at 19–22. 
 169.  See Autor & Scarborough, supra note 164, at 221.  
 170.  See Wozniak, supra note 164, at 549 (finding that pro-drug-testing legislation increases black 
employment and wages and that “employers substitute white women for blacks in the absence of 
testing”). 
 171.  Holzer et al., supra note 164, at 474 (finding that firms that used criminal background checks are 
more likely to hire African American workers).  
 172.  Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does ‘Ban the Box’ Help or Hurt Low-Skilled Workers? 
Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories are Hidden 2 (Nat’l 
Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22469, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22469 
[https://perma.cc/99TH-J9E2]. 
 173.  See Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 214. 
 174.  Id. at 198–99 (citing the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
233, 122 Stat. 881, 883, 888 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1182(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(b))). 
 175.  See, e.g., CHI CHI WU, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., SOLVING THE CREDIT CONUNDRUM: 
HELPING CONSUMERS’ CREDIT REPORTS IMPAIRED BY THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS AND GREAT 
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information may be justified on these grounds. Society has long offered a “fresh 
start” to bankrupt debtors, in part because they are viewed as “honest but 
unfortunate.”176 The primary component of this fresh start is the discharge, but 
bankruptcy law also prohibits the government and employers from 
discriminating against bankrupt debtors because of their insolvency.177 Limiting 
access to information about bankruptcy or other adverse events could further—
and broaden—this policy goal.178 The initial empirical evidence suggests that it 
does. Friedberg, Hynes, and Pattison estimate that unemployed individuals with 
troubled financial histories find employment more quickly in states that limit the 
use of credit reports in employment.179 Clifford and Schoag found that individuals 
living in areas with low average credit scores have improved employment 
outcomes in these states.180 
The two prior equity arguments do not justify the FCRA’s accuracy 
requirements, but an expansion of Ken Abraham’s “differential inaccuracy” 
argument might.181 According to this argument, “the risk of inaccurate 
classification should be borne by the community of all insureds, rather than by a 
few who suffer the entire disadvantage of inaccuracy.”182 Abraham offers an 
example in which young male drivers have higher average insurance claims 
because a small number of young males will drive drunk, and it is not 
 
RECESSION 2 (2013) (“[M]any of these foreclosures and other adverse mortgage events were not caused 
by bad decisions made by the borrowers, but both economic forces out of their control and fraud or abuse 
by servicers/lenders. . . . They are not bad or irresponsible people, but simply unlucky.”).  
 176.  Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286, 287 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 
244 (1934)). 
 177.  11 U.S.C. § 525 (2012). Courts disagree as to whether this provision prohibits private employers 
from discriminating against bankrupt debtors in employment because the code omits some language 
found in the prohibition against discrimination by the government. While the government may not “deny 
employment to, terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against” 
bankrupt debtors, § 525(a) (emphasis added), private employers may not “terminate the employment of, 
or discriminate with respect to employment against” bankrupt debtors, § 525(b). See 4 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 525.04[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.); Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 
251 B.R. 656 (S.D.N.Y 2000); Fiorani v. CACI, 192 B.R. 401 (E.D. Va. 1996); Pastore v. Medford Sav. 
Bank, 186 B.R. 553 (D. Mass. 1995).  
 178.  As noted in part II.B., the fresh start’s redistribution can have efficiency implications. 
 179.  Friedberg, Hynes & Pattison, supra note 29, at 4. 
 180.  See Clifford & Schoag, supra note 29, at 13. One paper also finds that the removal of negative 
information from the files of Swedish pawnshop customers improves their employment outcomes. See 
Marieke Bos et al., The Labor Market Effects of Credit Market Information 16 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 22436, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22436 [https://perma.cc/269D-
NJF5]. Studies that examine the removal of records of bankruptcy filings after seven to ten years find 
mixed effects. One study finds that the removal of the flag improves employment outcomes, Kyle 
Herkenhoff et al., The Impact of Consumer Credit Access on Employment, Earnings and 
Entrepreneurship 17 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22846, 2016), http://www.nber. 
org/papers/w22846 [https://perma.cc/N52R-AHBM], and yet another study finds little or no effect. Will 
Dobbie et al., Bad Credit, No Problem? Credit and Labor Market Consequences of Bad Credit 25–26 
(Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22711, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22711 
[https://perma.cc/RJY9-D8QA]. 
 181.  See Abraham, supra note 18, at 431. This is sometimes framed in terms of a lack of a causal link, 
but critics are usually referring to poor correlation. See Avraham et al., supra note 18, at 218–20. 
 182.  Abraham, supra note 18, at 431. 
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economically feasible to identify drunk drivers in advance.183 He posits that “[i]f 
all insureds were unaware of their own characteristics . . . enough of them would 
want protection against the risk of being in the group bearing the burden of 
inaccuracy.”184 
Abraham states that differential inaccuracy is an application of Rawls’s 
difference principle,185 but one does not need such extreme egalitarianism to 
justify risk-classification bans. According to Rawls’s difference principle, society 
should stand behind the veil of ignorance and maximize the welfare of the least 
well off.186 However, Rawls did not invent the veil of ignorance.187 Others have 
used it to reach different conceptions of equity, such as maximizing expected 
utility. For example, Harsanyi argued that because the marginal utility of 
consumption declines with wealth, a risk-averse individual standing behind a veil 
of ignorance would sacrifice some of the wealth of the most well-off in exchange 
for a smaller increase in the wealth of the least well-off.188 Rawls’s difference 
principle can be thought of as an extreme example of risk-aversion in which the 
individual would reduce the wealth of everyone in society to that of the pauper if 
the wealth of the pauper could be increased by just one dollar. 
If an individual’s welfare is assessed solely in terms of how much she has to 
pay for credit or insurance189 and that risk-classification does not enhance 
efficiency, then either Rawls’s difference principle or Harsanyi’s expected utility 
principle would ban risk-classification regardless of whether it is accurate. 
Banning classification would allow the highest-risk (and least well-off) consumers 
to pool with as many individuals as possible and maximize their welfare. In fact, 
these principles suggest that mistakes can improve equity by allowing the highest-
risk consumers to at least pool with those low-risk consumers who are 
misclassified. This preference for inaccurate systems would likely change once 
efficiency considerations are introduced, because more accurate classification 
systems are probably more efficient.190 
  
 
 183.  Id. at 432. 
 184.  Id. at 434. 
 185.  See id. at 431. 
 186.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12, 148–49 (1971). 
 187.  See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-
Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434, 434–35 (1953). 
 188.  Id.; John C. Harsanyi, Cardinal Welfare, Individualist Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of 
Utility, 63 J. POL. ECON. 309, 314–16 (1955). 
 189.  This assumption is too simplistic because automobile insurance would likely be just a small 
component of the budget of even the highest-risk drivers. The assumption is a little more plausible in 
another context in which differential inaccuracy has been used, AIDS testing. See Judith A. Berman, 
Note, AIDS Antibody Testing and Health Insurance Underwriting: A Paradigmatic Inquiry, 49 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1059, 1073–74 (1989) (examining the use of ELISA (enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay) testing to 
detect HIV, in spite of the test’s high rate of predictive inaccuracy, which disproportionately required 
individuals found positive by the test to bear the full burden of the entire class of HIV-positive patients).  
 190.  See part II.B for contrary arguments.  
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Abraham states that equitable considerations cannot justify laws that demand 
more accurate classification systems.191 Yet his differential accuracy principle 
might be extended to do just that. Rather than spreading the cost of inaccuracy 
by causing higher risk consumers to pool with more people, the law would 
mandate that the industry spend more on risk-classification to reduce inaccuracy 
and pass the cost onto more individuals. 
Assume that 950 low-risk and 50 high-risk consumers each apply for a $100 
loan in a competitive market with no time-value of money. The high-risk 
consumers will default totally and the low-risk consumers repay in full with 
certainty but are unwilling to repay more than $110. Lenders can use free, but 
shoddy, credit reports that identify the high-risk consumers but also misidentify 
ten percent of the low-risk consumers as high-risk. Using this test, lenders will 
correctly identify 855 consumers as low-risk and offer them a loan requiring a 
repayment of $100. Lenders will perceive 145 consumers as high-risk (50 truly 
high-risk consumers and 95 misidentified low-risk consumers); because no low-
risk consumer is willing to pay more than $110, none of these consumers will 
borrow.192 
Now assume that there is another test, say better credit reports that identify 
all consumers perfectly. If the goal is to raise aggregate social wealth, society 
should spend at least $950 to administer this test ($0.95 per application) as it 
would identify 95 consumers who would otherwise not get a loan and allow each 
to contract on terms that yield $10 in social surplus. For reasons previously 
explained, the industry may not adopt the perfect test even if doing raises 
aggregate social wealth. For example, lenders will not be able to recover the 
amount that they spent on the test if this cost is sunk at the time that lenders 
compete for the consumer’s business.193 But distributional concerns suggest that 
consumers may prefer that lenders adopt the perfect test, even if the cost of the 
test exceeds $950. Assume that the perfect test costs $1,000, or $1.00 per 
application and that lenders can recover this cost by charging an additional $1.05 
($1,000/950) for each consumer who is shown to be low-risk and qualified for the 
loan. Switching from the rough test to the perfect test has reduced the consumer’s 
expected surplus. The rough test gave her a ninety percent chance of a $10 gain, 
or $9 on average, while the perfect test gives her $8.95 with certainty. But if risk-
averse consumers were given the choice before they knew whether their file 
would be the one with the mistake, they may choose $8.95 with certainty to a 
ninety percent chance of $10 and a ten percent chance of receiving nothing. In 
other words, risk-averse consumers may prefer that the market spend additional  
  
 
 191.  Abraham, supra note 18, at 431 (“Any classification system can achieve only a certain level of 
accuracy. Even if that level has not yet been reached, inefficiency, not unfairness, is properly the focus of 
criticism.”). 
 192.  The average probability of repayment in the high-risk pool is (95/145), and so the required 
repayment must be at least $152.63 ($152.63*(94/145)=$100). 
 193.  See supra notes 100–103, and accompanying text. The cost would not be sunk if lenders charged 
an application fee. 
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amounts to avoid the differential inaccuracy that afflicts the unlucky few who 
would otherwise find significant errors in their credit files. 
Just as it is possible that more accurate credit reports are less efficient, it is 
also possible that they are less equitable. The previous analysis assumed that the 
high-risk consumers did not get a loan before or after the change and so did not 
consider their welfare. Relaxing this assumption would make the equitable 
considerations more complicated, because more accurate tests would cause fewer 
low-risk consumers to pool with the high-risk consumers. Thus the high-risk 
consumers would be worse off. If one believes that the high-risk consumers are 
the least well off in society and would benefit from the loan (both propositions 
are debatable), this would weaken the equitable case for more accurate credit 
reports. 
Differential inaccuracy may explain why the law places greater weight on 
misstatements than omissions. Although the FCRA may hold credit bureaus 
liable for falsely reporting that a debtor had filed for bankruptcy,194 credit 
bureaus face no liability for failing to report that a debtor filed for bankruptcy or 
missed payments, and the FCRA even prohibits credit bureaus from correctly 
reporting that other consumers had filed for bankruptcy eleven years ago.195 Both 
mistakes and omissions make it harder to determine the risk that a particular 
debtor will default and thus will cause some lower-risk debtors to pool with some 
higher-risk debtors. But the limits on the use or content of credit reports should 
operate in a manner that causes relatively few higher-risk debtors (those with 
adverse events far in the past) to pool with a relatively large number of lower-
risk debtors. In contrast, misstatements will cause relatively few low-risk debtors 
(those unlucky enough to have misstatements in their file) to pool with a large 
pool of high-risk debtors. As a result, omissions spread the cost of subsidizing 
high-risk debtors across the entire population of low-risk debtors while mistakes 
concentrate this cost on the unlucky few. 
Equitable justifications help explain FCRA’s limits on the use or content of 
credit reports and its greater emphasis on misstatements than omissions, but, like 
other equitable policy justifications, they are vulnerable to the argument that it 
is more efficient to use the tax-and-transfer system to redistribute wealth.196 A 
long literature explores the use of the tax-and-transfer system to redistribute 
wealth from high to low-income households,197 but tax systems also redistribute 
wealth along other dimensions. For example, federal law allows individuals to 
deduct large medical expenses from their taxable income and gives the blind a 
higher standard deduction.198 Society could use the tax-and-transfer system to 
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transfer sums to those with rare diseases (in lieu of health-insurance pooling) or 
even those with poor credit. 
A potential advantage of using the tax system is that it avoids “double 
distortion.”199 Some insurance scholars argue that using risk-classification to 
redistribute wealth can avoid the distortion of the labor–leisure choice created 
by the tax system.200 However, the tax system need not distort the choice between 
labor and leisure if we are willing to accept the same distributional consequences 
of a limit on risk-classification. The law could, for example, offer individuals with 
genetic diseases tax credits and finance this credit by assessing a fixed tax on all 
other taxpayers. But restrictions on risk-classification may create another 
distortion because they make insurance or credit less expensive for high-risk 
households and more expensive for low-risk households. This is distortionary if 
it causes high-risk households to consume more insurance or credit than they 
would have had they been given an equivalent wealth transfer and low-risk 
households to consume less. 
This is not the appropriate forum for reviewing the extremely large literature 
critiquing the “double distortion” argument.201 However, at least a couple of the 
counter-arguments are plausible in this context. First, society may want to distort 
the high-risk households’ choices because these choices create externalities for 
the rest of society. Society may be pleased that risk-pooling can distort the sick’s 
choice of healthcare if it is more concerned about the health of the sick than the 
overall happiness of the sick. Similarly, if society gave a tax credit to high-risk 
drivers, they may continue to drive without automobile insurance, so society may 
wish to instead subsidize their insurance by forcing risk-pooling. Finally, 
unemployment may confer negative externalities on society in terms of crime and 
social assistance costs, so society may wish to subsidize the employment of high-
risk employees by forcing risk-pooling rather than simply providing cash transfers 
or tax credits. 
Administrative costs provide a second reason to prefer redistribution through 
risk-classification. Logue and Avraham argue that the government must expend 
resources to enforce restrictions on risk-classification, but the amount may be 
considerably less than the resources needed to determine the size of the transfer 
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V 
CONCLUSION 
Credit-reporting mistakes can severely limit a consumer’s ability to obtain 
employment, credit, insurance, and housing. However, the social costs of these 
errors are likely to be significantly lower than the loss suffered by the mistakes’ 
victims because credit reports are risk-classification tools. If these mistakes force 
consumers into higher-risk pools and cause them to pay more for credit and 
insurance, they should also reduce the amount that those rightly in these risk-
pools must pay. This does not mean that the social costs are zero, and plausible 
market failures may prevent the industry from taking sufficient care to avoid 
mistakes. However, this article argues that the efficiency justifications for existing 
and proposed regulations are still dubious because the regulations are not 
designed to address these market failures and are instead likely to make them 
worse. Most significantly, the law holds the credit reporting industry liable for 
misstatements but not omissions. As a result, greater liability is likely to replace 
one type of error (mismeasured variables) with another (omitted variables). 
Even though the existing and proposed regulations may reduce market 
efficiency, they may still be socially desirable if they can more effectively achieve 
socially preferred redistribution than can the tax-and-transfer system. This desire 
for equity, and in particular the desire to reduce differential inaccuracy, may 
explain the law’s disproportionate focus on misstatements over omissions as well 
as the desire to prohibit the use of some information. 
 
